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Abstract 
 
Pension system provides a financial support towards elder people as well as those that are incapable to work, by assuring the 
main providers regarding to the consumer balancing tools through all the life cycle.For the majority of population, the pension 
benefits present the main income stream during the retirement time. Each country does have a national strategy seeking the 
social insurance provided for all the people, thus expressing the society solidarity for groups in needs due to the health 
problems, old generation problems or unemployment. By social protection through the re-distribution of incomes, social welfare 
is provided. Nowadays the pension fund management presents a very important topic in the sphere of economics. The aim of 
this paper is to examine the negative impact of pension found on Albania pension system. The paper argues about the 
problems that pension found are facing in Albania and the measurements that have to be taken in order to have a more 
efficient pension fund management.The methodology used in the preparation of this paper will be that of the utilizing the foreign 
and national literature. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The 21st century has faced up humanity with many great human challenges. One of these actual sharpest problems is the 
preservation of the human resources development equilibrium. 
We are in front of the fact that the rhythm of birth are decreasing and the average life -length of people is 
increasing, the third age group number is raising at a very galloping rhythm compared to the working power. At such 
conditions, the old system of social insurance Pay-As-You-Go, ideated over 100 years ago, whose at its basis stands the 
principle of solidarity and generations’ continuity, each day is approaching the impossibility to fulfill the needs of the third 
age population. If there would be an unchanging world the principle of Pay-As-You-Go financial system, it would be more 
stable if the appropriate tax fee is decided as well as the right norms of benefit. But the world is going forward 
globalization, opposite the effects of economic decline, unemployment, the early retirement and the increase of the 
average life-length, the increase of the expectancy on the inflation norm and the incredible increase of the human 
services’ costs. 
With an aging population and together with the burden of pensions and social welfare, the economic growth will 
always be very little. If there is no measure taken today, it is going to be very difficult.1 
The main reason of the reformation of social insurance system requires is connected to actual problems that worry 
our economy. The system does not offer financial stability. This instability is directly connected to other factors as well. 
The transition from the economic plan in that of the market was accompanied by negative impacts, such as massive 
increase of unemployment, increase of informal economy, and the early retirement. These changes led to the 
deterioration of the contributor/benefiter ratio, which from the value of 4 contributors per benefiter decreased into 1.3 
contributors per 1 benefiter. The participation of the contributors into this scheme is relatively low. The process of 
privatization of the strategic sectors of economy will influence in the increase of the private sector role in economy. This 
will as well lead to the increase of invasion in the scheme. The demographic prognosis testifies that in Albania it will raise 
the undesired tendency of the population’s aging. Having an increase of this category of population, therefore, we will 
have an increase of expenditure in the scheme of Social Insurance. The setting of minimum and maximum limits in the 
amount of pension, in combination with the unequal verified indexing during the increase of the pensions have influenced 
in the weakening of dependence between the given contributions and the benefits that can be profited by the pension’s 
scheme. 
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2. Actual Problems of the Pension System 
 
There is need to stress the fact that pensions are an indispensable and important element of social protection. 17.2 per 
cent of the population benefits from them, an indicator that has a clear tendency towards increase. It is spent 40.2 billion 
of Albanian Leks from the social insurance  
It exists a low level of incomes in ratio to the GNP of 5.03 per cent vs. 8-10 per cent of the countries surrounding 
us, a low benefiter-contributor ratio of 1.3 and 1, a very low scale of replacement (the ratio of average pension to average 
salary) of 38-42 per cent, a low percentage of the working population inducted in the system of only 30-32 per cent, etc.2 
All these elements have significantly affected the budget financing and subventions. The system offers low benefits with 
high contributions and the strategy of its reformation and increase of its financial stability is connected to these main 
issues that require solution. 
As well, the formula of benefit for the pension is the basis of the pension plus 1 per cent per working year. But the 
only benefiters to benefit the additional amount set by the law in such cases are those individuals whose salary is much 
higher than a minimum salary. Theoretically, this would insure 73 per cent of the salary for a person of average salary 
that would result to be satisfactory for the individual. But in reality the average full pension in the urban sector according 
to the official data reaches 40 -48 per cent of the gross covered salary, which means that it does not differ a lot from the 
basic pension.  
First, this pension is limited at the double of the basic pension, where the individuals with higher incomes who can 
assure incomes higher than the average salary will reach the limits.  
Second, the pension is limited in case an individual reaches 75 per cent of the average net salary higher than that 
of the three consequent last years in the final 10 years.  
Third, the pensions are limited even more because the law previews that the salaries in the past should be re-
evaluated in accordance to the increase of contributions per year, whereas the limits in practice are applied on the 
average of normal salaries. The norms of replacement for the salaries which are higher and bearing difficulty result at the 
rate of 30-35 per cent. Based on the formula of pension calculation, it is noticed that the redistribution is applied only in 
the cases when the pensioner has paid the minimum contributions per month due to his/her minimum salary. 
Another element of this formula is the coefficient of the contribution period. The coefficient is important for the 
individuals who have not contributed for 35 years despite they have had a high salary. It can happen that someone has 
paid maximum contributions for 25 years, contributing more in the scheme rather than a person of 35 years of 
contribution and with a minimum salary. There are no benefits even for individuals who have contributed for more than 35 
years, even though they pay minimum contributions.  
Pensions have to be indexed according to inflation. But in reality it has been done only an increase of the minimum 
pensions higher than compared to the average and maximum pensions. The real average pension is supposed to be 
under the average standard of living, the individuals benefit minimum pension despite the amount of contributions 
contributed in the scheme. The international data demonstrate that for every increase of 0.3 per cent of employment we 
have got a reduction of 1 per cent of the norm of contributions in the scheme. Thus, with the decrease of the contribution 
norms with 7-9 per cent, employment should raise with 10 per cent. In this way, there will be generated more incomes in 
the scheme of social insurance.  
Not offering stimulus in the formula of benefits for the individuals who contribute, it makes it impossible the 
declaration of the real salary of individuals. When the pensioners profit a minimum pension despite the fact of declaration 
in minimum salaries, it is normal that they choose to declare the minimum salary. This situation is very real in the private 
sector, whereas about 50 per cent of the employees declare minimum salary when this sector offers higher salaries than 
the state sector. This is because the maximum salary that is subject of contributions equals 5 times of the minimum 
salary, whereas the maximum pension they benefit is twice the minimum pension,  
It exists a disproportion at very high levels. The individuals with high incomes will benefit a maximum pension 
quicker than the fulfillment of the 35 years of working contribution. 
For these individuals, early retirement, despite the lowering percentages that is applied, does not affect negatively 
because the pension does not change. In this way the limits put for the payment of the pensions serve for the 
preservation under control of the expanses for the pensions but on the other side they provide the individual a stimulus to 
early retirement.  
An over-favoring is attributed to the pensioners in the rural sector, where the employees in this sector are 
estimated with fixed contributions and the calculation of the contribution is done on basis of the minimum urban salary 
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and he/ she pays to the ISSH (Institute of Social Insurance) the difference between this value and the fixed contribution 
that is paid by rural employees. Rural contributors are more namely contributors than valuable ones. The average 
contribution of the rural contributors is 1/3 of the urban area’s contributions. The minimum pension of rural pensioners is 
about 68 per cent of the urban areas’ pensioners. In fact, the rural old age pension is more a social help for the self-
employed in the agricultural sector and it is based on the low contributions they pay. The process of equalizing the rural 
pensions to the urban ones remains an actual problem that exists in the system of pensions. 
 
3. The Importance of the Pension Scheme Reformation 
 
All these changes sensitively affect the system creating the imposibility for financing. In order to resolve this problematic 
situation, it is important the undertaking of a general reform of pensions. At its foundations, it stands the construction of 
an altered system of multycolumns which would make possible the combination for financial participationin the pension 
fund of the old state system P.A.Y.G to the private system of the individual’s responsibility to take part in the solution of 
the social problems. This system would be composed of the column of the state system P.A.Y.G, the second column is 
the mandatory private system, the third column is the suplementary voluntary private system. Pensions’ reforms have 
occurred in all the member states of EU. A strong tendency of this reformationas been the speed of mix columns spread 
in these countries.  
Some states have implemented an imaginary estimation. The estimations consider GNP in increase and the future 
of lifelength to define the benefits.  
The consolidation of the scheme with three columns in Albania will be a very productive inititive. Borrowing form 
the model of the EU member states, it will be reached to create a system of pensions based on the self- interet and 
responsibility to be insured at third age.  
Latvia3 is the best example for the existence of the best effective and progressive pension system. According to 
this reform we will have:  
1. The mandatory non-financed pension plan, well-known as P.A.Y.G. is a plan that has at its basis the collection 
of the taxes to govern the third age which is transfered in the social budget and it is used to finance the actual 
generation of pensioners.  
2. The state mandatory voluntary pension plan. 
A part of the paid funds at the first level of the pension system is divided in order to give the pensioners the 
opportunity to be invested at benefit and to increase the old age of pensioners. Choosing the fund manager 
and the most appropriate investment plan where there are invested means in the financial markets, se secure 
the pensions’ increase. The people who are involved int his scheme born after July 1. 1971. 
With the increase of the pension’s age it can be chosen to add the estimated capital in the second levelof the 
pensions’ system at level 1 to receive pension from the state to buy the policy of ensuring the life of the 
pensioner by insurance companies and to benefit a pension according to the terms of concesion. The total of 
contributions of social insurance for a pension are divided between the pension systems of level 1 and 2. You 
ar enot obliged to pay any additional tax of social contribution for participation at column 2. In the future the 
assets assured in pension system number 2 together with the additional benefit can compose a considerable 
contribution of the pension. 
3. The pivate pension fund gives the opportunity to gather the voluntary savings for a private pension to complete 
pension 1, 2. The investments in private pensions can be done by the individual in his/her means, by the 
employer in the account of his/her imployee by the company funds. Different by the state pensions, the 
accumulation of the private pensions can be reached at the age of 55 and it is iheritable.  
Each person who is insured at the age of 65 benefits an amount of pension 80 per cent of the average of his/her 
entire life incomes after having paid contributions for 45 years. The scheme will allow people themselves to define their 
pension age, if one person born after January 1. 1955 and he has paid contributions up to 37.5 years, he/she (for women 
this system will be relevant only after 2028) can retire between 62-65 years old.  
If the person remains at work until the age of 68, there will be applied special bonuses. Exactly, this gives value to 
the system because in reality currently pensioners are paid a maximum pension that is double the minimum pension even 
when he has fulfilled and overpassed the years to benefit pension. 
The EU member states specifically, the example of Denmark4 the situation of the employees as far as it concerns 
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the employees who are 50 years old are praised for their experience and performance at work. Very few european 
countries have a great ratio of the old people still working compared to Denmark, where about 58 per cent of the 55-64 
year old are still working. The retirement age is 67 in Denmark, the pensions’ benefits cannot be paid before the age of 
60. The Danish government pays an essential importance to the treatment done to the integration of the old employees at 
work. It is spent about 7.4 per cent of the GNP for the treatment and education. Many courses and programs are 
specified for the population of over 50 years old. 
Meanwhile Swenden5 as well decided that the personal accounts were the best current way to insure the workers 
who can benefit a secure and apppropriate pension. Thus, there were two solutions before: to increase the tax or to lower 
the benefit of the ability paying lengthening or to give to the workers a private pension account. It was decided that 
privatization was the most adequate way. The new system has got four main features. 
1. Partial privatization. Workers can invest 2.5 points of per cent at the 18.5 per cent of their incomes that they 
have to leave aside to retire. Workers can decide very quickly at what fund they should send their savings. 
2. Imaginary accounts. The taxes of the remaining salary finances the dramatic structuring of the governing 
PAYG program. Instead of paying benefits on basis of the working force years, the new system previews a 
pension based on the amounts of the tax obligation (taxes) which the worker has paid in the system. 
3. Net insurance to protect the poor. The state is going to insure a minimum pension fund insured by the tax 
incomes. 
4. Transition to protect the pensioners and the elderly. The actual pensioners and elderly will continue to get 
incomes by the pension on basis of the old program. The workers born after 1938-1953 will take benefits by 
the new and old system. 
By creating a system of notional accounts (in reality there are not deposits on cash means) by linking retirement 
benefits it will be financed a minimum pension on the collection of general tax revenues. Those born before 1938 will 
benefit all of the benefits of old pension system. Retirement for those born between 1938-1953 will benefit earnings by a 
combination between the old system and the new one. 
Under the new system the prospective pension for each employee will be based on the amount accumulated on 
both two separate individual accounts. Most of retirement income although this may change if privatization occurs, will 
come from the imaginary account held by the government on behalf of the individual. An important part of retirement 
income, however, will come entirely from the private individual account. The overall rate for contributions is 18.5 per cent, 
which is slightly under the burden of tax of the old system. 
18.5 per cent is divided equally between employers and employees, where everyone pays 9.25 per cent on "basic 
pension income" in the system. This value is then divided though not uniformly between the maintaining account of the 
government and the government and private accounts. 
 
3.1 The imaginary individual account 
 
From 18.5 per cent of the tax of individual’s salary, the majority, 16 per cent of the salary goes to the government 
program. As is the case of PAYG system the means are used to finance the benefits of current retirees. 16 per cent of the 
tax for each employee’s salary is credited to individual accounts even though the accounts were fictional. These are 
fictional accounts credited annually with "profits" based on salary growth per capita basis. Starting at the age of 61 a 
worker can retire, and the government uses monetary fund in this imaginary account to calculate the notional annual 
benefit for a retired worker. It is important to be stressed that, the calculation is based on life expectancy, the length of 
stay of an employee at work, the amount of benefit which he/she receives annually. This reform is expected to discourage 
workers who come to early retirement, which is a common phenomenon.  
The table presented below illustrates the pension penalties for workers who come to early retirement, and the 
bonus they receive when they go to later in retirement. 
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The new pension system will regulate retirement benefits for inflation, though the adjustment will vary depending on real 
salary growth. This provision creates a direct link between income growth of the work force and tax paid for income, and 
benefits paid to retirees. This system ensures financial sustainability. But one should not forget the fact that adjustments 
for inflation may be higher or lower than the rate of inflation depending on whether the real salary growth is higher or 
lower than 1.6 per cent. 
Interesting features of the notional accounts system are:  
• As far as the imaginary accounts it will be assigned a modest administrative fee to cover the cost of running 
the government program.  
• The balance of accounts is not transferable to heirs. 
• Workforce that leaves to take care of children is credited with contributions from their account.  
 
3.2 Private Individual accounts 
 
From 18.5 per cent of the tax and the individual salary event he smallest part 2.5 per cent of the salary goes to private 
account. This is the financing system part, which means that money is invested in real assets that can be sold to 
generate income during retirement.  
• This system was created to discourage funds with high administrative fees. 
• Workers can choose where they want to ensure the provision of income for heirs in case of premature death.  
The gradual transition to the new system does not affect individuals born before 1938, and the old system does not 
affect individuals born after 1953. Persons born between the period 1938 and 1953 profit a mixed benefit as shown in the 
table below. For example one born in 1948 benefits 70 per cent of the pension benefits in the new systems  
 
 
  
4. Main Findings and Conclusions 
 
By filing the problematic situation that our system generates and by the comparison with some of the EU member states it 
emerges the fact that the reformation scheme is a very good opportunity to bring financial sustainability and the 
appropriate benefits for the elderly to cope retirement. This is because this scheme currently suffers from a deep deficit 
and provides benefits covering quite a low and a small number of third ages. Therefore if this scheme is not reformed, the 
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benefits will always be lower and some of the citizens will not benefit at retirement. Other motives of reforming the 
pension scheme are referred as well to the progress of future demographic trends, the data are referred to INSTAT where 
the fertility rate will drop and this will increase the life expectancy of the third age. World Bank’s suggestions are based on 
the idea of our country's integration with in region and the EU countries. We benefit from European experience in the use 
of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) used by these countries to exchange experiences in the field of pensions.  
The combination of partial privatization and the PAYG reform part of the retirement pension system will result in the 
sustainable fiscal system.  
Private investment will allow workers to benefit from the rate of return, and will increase the retirement incomes. By 
reducing the rate of salaries’ tax and linking the incomes to the retirement benefits would increase incentives to work. 
Shifting to a funded system will increase national savings and provide capital for the growth of the future. The first lesson 
is that countries can switch from a PAYG program into a personal account.  
The best option to benefit all individual workers and the entire economy is if the old-age system is partially 
privatized. In the partial privatization, workers can put 18.5 per cent of their incomes aside for retirement, but they are 
ready to invest 2.5 per cent of the money in individual accounts. Workers will be able to choose the best fund pension 
that suits their investment preferences.  
The positivity of this system lies in the fact that the return of incomes from imaginary accounts is associated with 
salary growth per capita, while the returns of private accounts to retirement should reflect long-term return on capital 
investment. Under the new program, employees may choose to retire at the age of 61 or stay at work until the age of 70. 
For attraction brings low benefits at earlier retirement and more incomes when the withdraw later in life, this has no 
consequences for taxpayers. Workers can continue to work while they benefit an amount of pension. They can choose a 
partial retirement (25 per cent, 50 per cent, or 75 per cent of the amount that they can benefit depending on their age). 
The future is especially attractive for workers who want withdraw gradually from labor force. They choose a full pension, 
of course they receive a full pension recalculated in accordance with the age and number of imaginary accounts.  
The benefits that this new scheme provides are: 
Great incentive to work. In the new pension system the pensions are defined by incomes generated throughout life, 
which means that at every profiting year the benefits will have a positive impact on the benefits of prospective retirees. 
Pension rights shall be recorded in real accounts and individual imaginary accounts, workers will have less reason to hide 
and do not report their incomes. The system will also discourage labor force who leaves the market power.  
The increase of national savings and flexible age of retirement will enable non- penalization or non-reward for early 
retirement. Workers can retire at the age of 61 or can stay in the labor market as they wish. All these positive impacts 
make it more attractive having an alternate parallel system as the EU member countries.  
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